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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The debate over “affirmative consent” suffers from conceptual 
confusion and unwarranted assumptions.  This Article seeks to clarify the 
concept of affirmative consent and dispel mistaken assumptions.  In its most 
basic form, affirmative consent is a relatively modest reform that has already 
taken root, either overtly or sub silentio, in many American jurisdictions.1  
Affirmative consent does not offer the significant reform that some of its 
advocates desire nor present the dire risks many of its opponents fear.2 
This Article makes the following points: 
                                                                                                                 
 * Joseph C. Hostetler–BakerHostetler Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, 
Cleveland State University.  Thanks to Arnold Loewy and the Texas Tech Law Review student editors for 
organizing this symposium.  Thanks to participants in the AALS Symposium: Violence Against Women 
at the 2016 American Association of Law Schools (AALS) Annual Meeting as well as to the participants 
in the 2015 North East Ohio Faculty Colloquium for their valuable feedback on some of the ideas in this 
Article. 
 1. See infra Section III.E. 
 2. See infra Part III (discussing misconceptions about affirmative consent). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2931038 
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 The phrase “yes means yes” is a slogan (perhaps a good one), 
not an actual legal standard or an explanation of a legal standard. 
 Affirmative consent does not require “express verbal 
agreement.” 
 Many advocates and critics assume that affirmative consent 
necessarily means “unambiguous consent” when, in fact, it does not.  
Some affirmative consent policies additionally require that consent be 
unambiguous, but many do not.  This is a major distinction and one that 
has been ignored in the debate over affirmative consent.  Unambiguous 
consent represents a significant change in the law whereas affirmative 
consent does not. 
 Commentators state that affirmative consent changes the legal 
standard from one that requires an affirmative “no” to one that requires 
an affirmative “yes.”  In fact, this change has been underway for decades 
as courts have steadily abandoned and rejected any rule that requires 
even “verbal resistance”—a clear “no.”  This is an important but 
incremental shift and has already occurred in most jurisdictions, 
regardless of whether the jurisdiction invokes the concept of affirmative 
consent. 
 Commentators suggest that affirmative consent policies 
change the significance of silence or passivity in rape cases.  Some 
suggest that in the past, silence or passivity was equated with consent 
whereas under affirmative consent, it is not.  The first claim—silence or 
passivity equals consent—was true in the past but is no longer true, at 
least as a doctrinal matter, in most jurisdictions today.3  The second 
claim—silence or passivity does not show consent under affirmative 
consent policies—suffers from a critical ambiguity.4  The more 
plausible resolution of that ambiguity shows silence and passivity play 
largely the same role under an affirmative consent policy as they do 
under existing law—namely, that silence or passivity is relevant but not 
sufficient standing alone to show the presence of consent. 
At the heart of many of these confusions are unexplained and unjustified 
assumptions about how human communication works.5  Both advocates and 
critics of affirmative consent policies seem to share the misperception that 
parties to sexual encounters commonly fail to communicate to each other 
their agreement to engage in sex.6  Of course, parties to sexual encounters 
routinely communicate with one another in ways that are indirect, subtle, and 
nonverbal, but they are communicating nonetheless (not always 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See infra notes 158–59 and accompanying text (suggesting that the jurisdictions that equate 
silence with consent are outliers). 
 4. See infra notes 151–53 and accompanying text (noting that ambiguity results from policies that 
do not make it clear that silence does not indicate consent). 
 5. See infra Section III.F. 
 6. See infra Section III.F. 
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successfully).7  In the vast majority of sexual encounters—including the vast 
majority of those contested encounters involving an allegation of rape or 
sexual assault—some affirmative signal or signals are sent between the 
parties.8  Accordingly, requiring that consent be affirmative—that some 
positive signal be sent—will impact relatively few cases, and many of those 
cases are already successfully prosecuted under existing law.9 
The main difficulty in many contested cases of rape or sexual assault is 
how to interpret various signals—verbal and nonverbal—sent between the 
parties to the encounter.  The dispute is not over whether a signal was sent at 
all, and thus, requiring affirmative consent does not assist with or change that 
difficult task.  That is because the problem is not in determining whether 
some affirmative signal was sent but in determining whether the combination 
of words and conduct, on balance and in context, indicated agreement to sex. 
This Article aims to “unpack” the concept of affirmative consent by 
identifying common assertions about affirmative consent that are false or 
misleading and by separating issues that are commonly conflated.  The goal 
here is not to advocate either for or against the notion of affirmative consent 
but to clarify the concept to show what is at stake (and what is not at stake) 
in these debates. 
Part II of this Article sets forth definitions of affirmative consent, 
particularly noting the difference between policies that require unambiguous 
agreements and those that do not.  Part III addresses the various 
misconceptions identified above.  Section III.A discusses the “yes means 
yes” slogan.  Section III.B notes that affirmative consent does not mean 
express verbal agreement.  Section III.C explains that affirmative consent is 
different from unambiguous consent.  Section III.D discusses the shift from 
“no means no” to “yes means yes,” noting that this change in the law has 
already occurred in most jurisdictions, regardless of whether the jurisdiction 
uses the term “affirmative consent.”  Section III.E discusses the role of 
silence under affirmative consent policies, analyzing a significant ambiguity 
on this point.  Section III.F seeks to dispel the perception that in many sexual 
encounters, the parties fail to indicate their interest in sex. 
II.  DEFINITIONS OF AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT 
The concept of affirmative consent carries with it a cluster of both 
substantive rules (related to the definition of consent) and procedural rules 
(related to how criminal prosecutions or university adjudications should be 
conducted).10  This Article focuses on the former, not the latter—examining 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See infra Section III.F. 
 8. See infra Section III.F. 
 9. See infra Section III.F. 
 10. See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform, 
125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1946 (2016) (discussing the developments of both the procedural and substantive 
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the substantive concept of affirmative consent, not analyzing the various 
procedural rules that might go along with such a standard.11 
Rape law has long contained a consent element.12  Most American 
jurisdictions do not use the concept of affirmative consent to describe the 
consent element, although a few do.  In the 1992 M.T.S. decision, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey interpreted its state law to require “freely given 
affirmative permission to the specific act of sexual penetration.”13  A few 
other states have statutory definitions that likewise require affirmative 
consent.14 
The concept of affirmative consent has spread much more rapidly in the 
context of higher education.  Hundreds of college and university policies now 
include some definition of affirmative consent as a component of their 
university sexual assault policies.15 
Definitions of affirmative consent vary somewhat, but they can be 
categorized conceptually into two main groups: those that require some 
affirmative signal of consent and those that additionally require that consent 
be unambiguous or clearly expressed. 
                                                                                                                 
components of affirmative consent policies); Wendy Adele Humphrey, “Let’s Talk About Sex”: 
Legislating and Educating on the Affirmative Consent Standard, 50 U.S.F. L. REV. 35, 41 (2016) 
(discussing both procedural and substantive issues in affirmative consent policies). 
 11. Several procedural issues are under consideration in connection with university affirmative 
consent policies. See, e.g., Humphrey, supra note 10, at 39–40.  To give just one example, there is 
considerable debate over whether universities should use a preponderance of the evidence standard in 
sexual assault cases or whether the standard should be higher. Id. at 46 (“[S]ome have criticized the 
preponderance of the evidence standard for being too low when determining a claim of sexual violence 
on campus, others maintain that the standard is appropriate . . . .”) (footnote omitted); Anderson, supra 
note 10 (defending the preponderance standard on the ground that it is the ordinary standard for university 
disciplinary adjudications); Charles M. Sevilla, Campus Sexual Assault Allegations, Adjudications, and 
Title IX, 39 CHAMPION, Nov. 2015, at 16, 16 (“[T]he school reaction is a process in which human rights 
are often sacrificed by collegiate bureaucrats. Campus sexual assaults are a serious issue deserving of 
appropriate investigation and adjudication, but institutions of higher learning should not implement 
Alice-in-Wonderland techniques.”); Allison L. Marciniak, Note, The Case Against Affirmative Consent: 
Why the Well-Intentioned Legislation Dangerously Misses the Mark, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 51, 67 (2015). 
 12. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210 (noting that rape is the “carnal knowledge 
of a woman forcibly and against her will”). 
 13. State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992) (“Such permission can be indicated either 
through words or through actions that, when viewed in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, 
would demonstrate to a reasonable person affirmative and freely-given authorization for the specific act 
of sexual penetration.”). 
 14. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11–1.70(a) (West 2012) (“‘Consent’ means a freely given 
agreement to the act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct in question.  Lack of verbal or physical 
resistance or submission by the victim resulting from the use of force or threat of force by the accused 
shall not constitute consent.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(7) (West 2007) (“‘Consent’ means 
that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact there are actual words or conduct 
indicating freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 940.225(4) (West 2013) (defining consent as “words or overt actions . . . indicating a freely given 
agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact”). 
 15. Humphrey, supra note 10, at 57 (“[A]ccording to the National Center for Higher Education Risk 
Management, more than 800 colleges have adopted a policy based on a consent-based model and have 
included a definition of affirmative consent in their sexual assault policies.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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A.  Affirmative Consent 
In the M.T.S. case, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained affirmative 
consent as follows: 
In a case such as this one, in which the State does not allege violence or 
force extrinsic to the act of penetration, the factfinder must decide whether 
the defendant’s act of penetration was undertaken in circumstances that led 
the defendant reasonably to believe that the alleged victim had freely given 
affirmative permission to the specific act of sexual penetration.  Such 
permission can be indicated either through words or through actions that, 
when viewed in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, would 
demonstrate to a reasonable person affirmative and freely-given 
authorization for the specific act of sexual penetration.16 
Beyond the term “affirmative permission” and the clarification that such 
permission could be indicated either through words or conduct, the court did 
not further define the concept.  Several other American jurisdictions use a 
similar standard.17 
Federal action has come from the Department of Education’s Office for 
Civil Rights (OCR) in the context of enforcing Title IX’s prohibitions on sex 
discrimination in higher education.18  The OCR issued a 2011 “Dear 
Colleague Letter,” providing guidance to universities on sexual assault 
policies and procedures.19  The Dear Colleague Letter explained that “a 
school’s responsibility [is] to respond promptly and effectively to sexual 
violence against students in accordance with the requirements of Title IX.”20 
Notably, neither the Dear Colleague Letter nor a 2014 “Questions and 
Answers” document uses the phrase “affirmative consent” or sets forth an 
affirmative consent standard.21  Instead, the Dear Colleague Letter describes 
                                                                                                                 
 16. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1278 (footnote omitted). 
 17. See supra note 14 (detailing several state statutes). 
 18. For a description of the origins of the affirmative consent standard in relation to Title IX, 
including the role of the OCR and the White House Task Force on Protecting Students from Sexual 
Assault, see Humphrey, supra note 10, at 41–54, and Janet Napolitano, “Only Yes Means Yes”: An Essay 
on University Policies Regarding Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 
393–94 (2015). 
 19. Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter from Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights Russlynn 
Ali, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104. 
pdf (addressing sexual violence as a form of sexual harassment under Title IX). 
 20. Office for Civil Rights, Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, U.S. DEP’T 
EDUC. (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf. 
 21. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 1978 (“OCR has so far declined to enter the substantive 
conversations about how to define sexual assault on college campuses.  However, at the same time that 
OCR was stepping up enforcement of Title IX against sexually hostile environments at colleges and 
universities, many campuses adopted affirmative consent standards to govern sexual behavior.”). 
62 TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:57 
 
procedures for handling sexual assault complaints but does not itself mandate 
an affirmative consent standard.22 
In 2014, the White House Task Force on Protecting Students from 
Sexual Assault issued a report titled “Not Alone.”23  The Task Force also 
released a “Checklist for Campus Sexual Misconduct Policies.”24  This 
checklist (unlike the Dear Colleague Letter) specifically includes an 
affirmative consent standard.25  The checklist states that a definition of 
consent should recognize, at a minimum, that: 
 
• consent is a voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity; 
• someone who is incapacitated cannot consent; 
• past consent does not imply future consent; 
• silence or an absence of resistance does not imply consent; 
•  consent to engage in sexual activity with one person does not imply  
  consent to engage in sexual activity with another; 
• consent can be withdrawn at any time; and 
• coercion, force, or threat of either invalidates consent.26 
 
California has adopted an affirmative consent standard for sexual assault 
policies at its state universities.27  The California legislative definition is the 
following: 
An affirmative consent standard in the determination of whether consent 
was given by both parties to sexual activity.  “Affirmative consent” means 
affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual 
activity.  It is the responsibility of each person involved in the sexual 
activity to ensure that he or she has the affirmative consent of the other or 
others to engage in the sexual activity.  Lack of protest or resistance does 
not mean consent, nor does silence mean consent.  Affirmative consent must 
be ongoing throughout a sexual activity and can be revoked at any time.  
The existence of a dating relationship between the persons involved, or the 
fact of past sexual relations between them, should never by itself be 
assumed to be an indicator of consent.28 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See Office for Civil Rights, supra note 20, at 24–26 (discussing ways to handle sexual violence). 
 23. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT, NOT ALONE: THE 
FIRST REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT i, 2 
(2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/report_0.pdf. 
 24. White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault, Checklist for Campus Sexual 
Misconduct Policies, DEP’T JUST. 1, 4, https://www.justice.gov/ovw/page/file/910271/download. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 4–5. 
 27. See S.B. 967, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (adding § 67386 to the California 
Education Code). 
 28. CAL. EDUC. CODE  § 67386(a)(1) (West 2014). 
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Many universities around the country similarly define affirmative consent to 
mean an “affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in 
sexual activity.”29 
The Affirmative Consent Project, a nonprofit organization devoted to 
combating and preventing sexual assault and violence on college campuses 
and elsewhere, states, “‘Affirmative consent’ means affirmative, conscious, 
and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity.”30 
The American Law Institute (ALI) is currently considering revisions to 
the rape and sexual assault provisions of the Model Penal Code.31  The 
discussion draft dated April 28, 2015 included an affirmative consent 
provision defined as follows: “‘Consent’ means a person’s positive 
agreement, communicated by either words or actions, to engage in a specific 
act of sexual penetration or sexual contact.”32 
Most of these definitions share the common thread of requiring that 
consent be given affirmatively.  Notably, none of these definitions expressly 
require that the affirmative consent must also be unambiguous.33 
B.  Affirmative, Unambiguous Consent 
A number of university policies go further than the standards set forth 
above and also include language requiring that affirmative consent be 
unambiguous or clear. 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Tara Culp-Ressler, What ‘Affirmative Consent’ Actually Means, THINKPROGRESS (June 25, 
2014), https://thinkprogress.org/what-affirmative-consent-actually-means-ea665b32b388#.djhqh85j4;  
see, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 478-120-024(20)(c)(i) (2016) (“‘Consent’ means that at the time of and 
throughout the sexual contact, there are actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement 
between the parties to engage in the sexual contact.”); GENDER-BASED MISCONDUCT OFFICE, 
GENDER-BASED MISCONDUCT POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR STUDENTS 4, 7 (rev. ed. 2016), 
www.columbia.edu/cu/studentconduct/documents/GBMPolicyandProceduresforStudents.pdf#page=9 
(requiring affirmative consent for all sexual contact and stating that “[a]ffirmative consent is a knowing, 
voluntary, and mutual decision among all participants to engage in sexual activity”); UNIV. OF HAW., 
INTERIM POLICY AND PROCEDURE ON SEX DISCRIMINATION AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 7 (2015), 
http://hawaii.edu/policy/docs/temp/ep1.204.pdf (“Consent is affirmative, conscious, and voluntary 
agreement to engage in agreed upon forms of sexual contact.”); UNIV. OF TENN., POLICY ON SEXUAL 
MISCONDUCT, RELATIONSHIP VIOLENCE, STALKING, AND RETALIATION 7 (2016), http://sexualassault 
.utk.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/34/2015/08/sexual_misconduct_policy.pdf (“Consent is an affirmative 
and voluntary agreement by a person to engage in a specific sexual act.”). 
 30.  What Is Affirmative Consent?, AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT PROJECT, affirmativeconsent.com/ 
whatisaffirmativeconsent/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2016). 
 31. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(3) (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015). 
 32. Id. This draft has since been withdrawn. See Kevin Cole, Backpedalling in Place: The ALI’s 
Move from “Affirmative” to “Contextual” Consent, SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript 
at 3–4) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714057##). 
 33. Cole argues that the ALI Discussion Draft’s use of the term “positive agreement” creates an 
ambiguity as to whether that agreement must be signaled clearly and unambiguously.  See Kevin Cole, 
Better Sex Through Criminal Law: Proxy Crimes, Covert Negligence, and Other Difficulties of 
“Affirmative Consent” in the ALI’s Draft Sexual Assault Provisions, SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2670419). 
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For example, the University of Minnesota’s policy defines affirmative 
consent as “informed, freely and affirmatively communicated willingness to 
participate in sexual activity that is expressed by clear and unambiguous 
words or actions.”34  The Yale University policy requires a “positive, 
unambiguous, and voluntary agreement to engage in specific sexual activity 
throughout a sexual encounter.  Consent cannot be inferred from the absence 
of a ‘no’; a clear ‘yes,’ verbal or otherwise, is necessary.”35  Other universities 
similarly use language requiring unambiguous consent.36 
Some universities first define affirmative consent without reference to a 
clear or unambiguous requirement but then go on in a later section or sentence 
to add that requirement. 
For example, New York’s policy for state universities begins with 
language very similar to California’s: “Affirmative consent is a knowing, 
voluntary, and mutual decision among all participants to engage in sexual 
activity.”37  This language does not include a requirement that consent be 
unambiguous—a notable shift given that an earlier draft of the policy did 
expressly require a clear, unambiguous agreement.38  However, in the next 
sentence, the New York policy adds that “[c]onsent can be given by words 
or actions, as long as those words or actions create clear permission regarding 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. 
 35. Yale Sexual Misconduct Policies and Related Definitions, Sexual Misconduct Response, YALE 
UNIV., smr.yale.edu/sexual-misconduct-policies-and-definitions (last updated May 10, 2016). 
 36. UNIV. OF COLO., ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY STATEMENT: SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 5 (2015), 
https://www.cu.edu/sites/defaults/files/5014.pdf (University of Colorado’s policy)  (“Affirmative consent: 
Means the unambiguous and voluntary agreement to engage in a specific sexual activity.  Consent is clear, 
knowing and voluntary words or actions which create mutually understandable clear permission regarding 
willingness to engage in, and the conditions of, sexual activity. Consent must be active; silence by itself 
cannot be interpreted as consent.”); UNIV. OF FLA., REGULATIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 
4.041(4)(b)(3) (2012), http://regulations.ufl.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/4041.pdf (University of 
Florida’s policy) (“Consent is given by an affirmative verbal response or acts that are unmistakable in 
their meaning.”); UNIV. OF MICH., THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN POLICY AND PROCEDURES ON 
STUDENT SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED MISCONDUCT AND OTHER FORMS OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 
15 (2016), https://publicaffairs.vpcomm.umich.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2016/04/SMP-Final-
master-version-4.6.16.pdf (University of Michigan’s policy) (“Consent is a clear and unambiguous 
agreement, expressed outwardly through mutually understandable words or actions, to engage in a 
particular activity.”); Student Sexual Misconduct Policy and Procedures: Duke’s Commitment to Title IX, 
DUKE POLICIES, http://policies.duke.edu/students/universitywide/sexualmisconduct.php (last updated 
Aug. 1, 2016)  (Duke University’s policy) (“Consent is an affirmative decision to engage in mutually 
acceptable sexual activity freely given by clear actions or words.”); Sexual Assault, U. OR., https://safe. 
uoregon.edu/sexual-assault (last visited Oct. 23, 2016) (University of Oregon’s policy) (“‘Explicit 
consent’ . . . means voluntary, non-coerced and clear communication indicating a willingness to engage 
in a particular act.  ‘Explicit consent’ includes an affirmative verbal response or voluntary acts 
unmistakable in their meaning.”). 
 37. Definition of Affirmative Consent, ST. U.N.Y., http://system.suny.edu/sexual-violence-
prevention-workgroup/policies/affirmative-consent/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2016). 
 38. See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, SUNY POLICIES ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND 
RESPONSE DECEMBER 1, 2014, REDLINED AGAINST NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATION, JUNE 2015, at 3 
(2015), http://system.suny.edu/media/suny/content-assets/documents/sexualviolenceprevention/suny-
policies-sexual-violence-prevention-response-updated-Jun2015.pdf. 
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willingness to engage in the sexual activity.”39  This seems to add a 
requirement that the agreement not only be affirmative but also that it be 
clear, which is a different concept.  This type of policy poses some 
interpretive challenges as the second sentence purports to simply clarify the 
first but does so by adding a substantially new and different requirement. 
This discussion does not represent an exhaustive catalogue of all the 
affirmative consent policies in American universities, but it provides an 
illustrative sample of how universities define the concept. 
III.  MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT 
The ongoing debate over affirmative consent is complicated by the fact 
that commentators often make unwarranted assumptions about the 
conceptual issues at play in affirmative consent reforms.  This Article seeks 
to clarify the concept of affirmative consent and dispel several unfounded 
assumptions.   
A.  “Yes Means Yes” Is a Slogan, Not a Legal Standard 
The catchphrase of affirmative consent is “yes means yes.”  This is a 
slogan, not a legal standard. 
Commentators regularly affiliate the concept of affirmative consent 
with the phrase “yes means yes.”40  Janet Napolitano, the president of the 
University of California system, summed up her adoption of an affirmative 
consent policy for the University of California by explaining, “Put simply, 
only yes means yes.”41 
Taken as a slogan, “yes means yes” seems a worthwhile and valuable 
educational tool.  The “yes means yes” slogan is designed to encourage all 
parties to a sexual encounter (particularly college students, at whom much of 
the advocacy is aimed) to make sure that their partner has freely indicated 
that he or she wants to have sex.42  It is designed to discourage persons from 
assuming that consent is present unless their partner objects and instead to 
encourage them to get an affirmative signal of agreement.43 
An educational slogan is not the same thing as a legal standard, 
however, and “yes means yes” is the former, not the latter.  First, none of the 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Definition of Affirmative Consent, supra note 37.  
 40. See Napolitano, supra note 18, at 389–90. 
 41. Id. at 390. 
 42. See id.; Jaclyn Friedman, Adults Hate ‘Yes Means Yes’ Laws. The College Students I Meet Love 
Them., WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/10/14/ 
adults-hate-affirmative-consent-laws-the-college-students-i-meet-love-them/; Jennifer Medina, Sex Ed 
Lesson: ‘Yes Means Yes,’ but It’s Tricky, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/10/15/us/california-high-schools-sexual-consent-classes.html. 
 43. See Medina, supra note 42. 
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affirmative consent policies actually define affirmative consent as “only yes 
means yes.” 
If it were a legal standard, the claim that “only yes means yes” could not 
be taken literally.  None of the existing affirmative consent standards require 
participants in sexual activity to use the word “yes.”  Thus, the claim that 
“only yes means yes” does not mean that consent can be signaled only by 
using the term “yes.” 
Another possible interpretation of “yes means yes” is that an agreement 
to sex must be signaled by some words or conduct that are the equivalent of 
a “yes.”  Not many affirmative consent policies actually state this, but a few 
do.  Yale’s policy states that “a clear ‘yes,’ verbal or otherwise, is 
necessary.”44 
Here, it is important to separate the following two ideas, discussed at 
greater length in Section III.C: an affirmative indication of agreement versus 
an unambiguous indication of agreement.  The Yale policy requires both; 
many policies only require the former.45  “Yes means yes,” as a legal 
standard, would not require that the indication of agreement be unambiguous, 
only that it be present.46 
Finally, as noted in the following Section, affirmative consent policies 
recognize that the affirmative signal of agreement to sex does not have to be 
verbal but can be expressed through conduct or words. 
The point here is not to criticize the phrase “yes means yes” but to clarify 
what purpose it serves.  It is a slogan and may be an effective slogan and 
public relations tool.47  It is not, however, the actual legal standard or legal 
definition of affirmative consent.  Discussions of affirmative consent would 
benefit from clarity on this point. 
B.  Affirmative Consent Does Not Mean “Express Verbal Agreement” 
Most legal commentators recognize that an affirmative consent standard 
does not require an express verbal agreement.  Michelle Anderson, defending 
the concept, has noted that affirmative consent can include “verbal or 
nonverbal agreement.”48  Janet Halley, criticizing the concept, has likewise 
recognized that California’s standard “does not require express consent, 
consent in words” but presumably includes consent “given by conduct.”49  A 
recent ALI draft of an affirmative consent proposal provided that consent 
constituted a “positive agreement, communicated by either words or 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Yale Sexual Misconduct Policies and Related Definitions, supra note 35. 
 45. Id.  
 46. See infra Section III.C. 
 47. See Medina, supra note 42. 
 48. Anderson, supra note 10, at 1978. 
 49. Janet Halley, The Move to Affirmative Consent, 42 SIGNS CURRENTS (2015). 
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actions.”50  The commentary noted that “[s]ome scholars have urged a 
requirement of explicit verbal assent,” but it concluded that this standard 
“finds no support in existing law and departs too far from current social 
practice.”51 The draft thus “recognizes the social reality that consensual 
sexual encounters quite frequently are not preceded by an explicit verbal 
‘yes.’”52  New Jersey’s M.T.S. decision, one of the earliest legal sources of 
an affirmative consent standard, noted that affirmative consent “can be 
indicated either through words or through actions.”53 
While legal commentators appear to appreciate this point, some 
journalists and advocates state or strongly imply that affirmative consent 
requires express verbal agreement.  A New York Magazine feature on the sex 
lives of college students claimed affirmative consent meant “every step 
toward sex being explicitly agreed to with a ‘yes.’”54  One of the California 
law’s cosponsors stated that the California bill means that individuals “must 
say ‘yes.’”55 
It is easy enough to require express verbal consent if that is the goal—
sexual assault can simply be defined as engaging in sexual conduct without 
express verbal consent.  Antioch College received considerable attention in 
the early 1990s for adopting a policy that did, in fact, require express verbal 
consent at each stage of a sexual encounter.56  This approach was heavily 
criticized and was not adopted by many other schools or jurisdictions.57  None 
of the current affirmative consent policies contain this requirement. 
                                                                                                                 
 50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(3) (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015).  
 51. Id. § 213.0 cmt. 3. 
 52. Id. 
 53. State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992). 
 54. Lauren Kern & Noreen Malone, College Sex 2015: An Introduction, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 18, 2015, 
9:00 PM), http://nymag.com/thecut/2015/10/sex-lives-of-college-students.html. 
 55. Josh Dulaney, Students Question ‘Affirmative Consent’ Bill Designed to Combat Sexual 
Assaults, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB. (June 8, 2014, 5:40 PM), http://www.sgvtribune.com/government-
and-politics/20140608/students-question-affirmative-consent-bill-designed-to-combat-sexual-assaults 
(discussing the statement of Assemblywoman Bonnie Lowenthal (D-Long Beach) on a draft version of 
the California legislation). 
 56. Robert Shibley, Antioch’s Infamous Sexual Assault Policy, FOUND. INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC. 
(June 15, 2007), https://www.thefire.org/antiochs-infamous-sexual-assault-policy/ (“Consent is defined 
as the act of willingly and verbally agreeing to engage in specific sexual conduct.”); see Phil McCombs, 
Taking a Look at Love, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 1996), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/ 
1996/02/16/taking-a-look-at-love/185120d7-78d5-426e-bab9-ad4cf2b50483/ (quoting ANTIOCH COLL., 
SEXUAL OFFENSE POLICY (1992)). 
 57. See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 179, 204 (2004) 
(“The most vitriolic criticisms of attempts to define consent have been reserved for the Antioch College 
Sexual Offense Policy.”). 
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C.  Affirmative Consent Is Different from “Unambiguous Consent” 
The most pervasive misunderstanding of affirmative consent is the 
notion that affirmative consent necessarily means “unambiguous 
consent.”  This is mistaken.  Affirmative does not mean unambiguous. 
Most affirmative consent policies do not require clear and unambiguous 
consent, but some of them do.  This is a major difference, which has gone 
largely unnoticed in the literature.  Requiring unambiguous consent 
represents a major change to existing sexual assault law or university 
policies.  Simply requiring affirmative consent does not. 
Dictionary definitions of “affirmative” do not support interpreting that 
word to mean “unambiguous” or “unequivocal.”  Random House’s 
definitions of affirmative as an adjective include: 
 
1. affirming or asserting the truth, validity, or fact of something 
2. expressing agreement or consent . . . . 
3. positive; not negative 
. . . . 
7. a manner or mode that indicates assent . . . .58 
 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines affirmative 
(adjective) as follows: 
[1.] CONFIRMATIVE, RATIFYING 
[2.] asserting a predicate of a subject or of a part of a 
subject also :  asserting the truth or validity of a statement . . . 
contrasted with negative 
[3.a.] asserting that the fact is so : declaratory of what 
exists . . . .59 
None of the various definitions indicate that affirmative means 
unambiguous or unequivocal. 
In the context of affirmative consent, the term affirmative seems to 
require some active signal of agreement rather than the absence of an express 
“no.”  Thus, Michelle Anderson explained that 
[a]ffirmative consent is the notion that mere passivity or acquiescence to the 
will of another does not constitute meaningful permission to engage in 
sexual penetration.  Meaningful consent must be active, and a person should 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Affirmative, RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2010). 
 59. Affirmative, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2002). 
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have to communicate positive, verbal or nonverbal agreement to engage in 
penetration before someone else should be allowed to penetrate them.60 
The contrast here is between some affirmative (or positive) signal versus 
inferring consent from the absence of any signal (or passivity).61  This is not 
the same thing as requiring the affirmative signal also be unequivocal or very 
clear. 
Wisconsin law requires that consent be affirmative—“an affirmative 
indication of willingness”—but there is no language in the statute or the case 
law suggesting that affirmative consent must be clear or unambiguous.62  The 
same is true in New Jersey—consent must be expressed affirmatively, but 
there is no case law suggesting that affirmative consent must be clear or 
unambiguous.63 
Canada likewise has an affirmative consent standard for sexual assault 
cases requiring “that the complainant had affirmatively communicated by 
words or conduct her agreement to engage in sexual activity.”64  At least one 
commentator characterized this as requiring communication that is “express, 
explicit, and unambiguous.”65  But the Canadian case law, like that of 
Wisconsin and New Jersey, does not appear to contain this additional 
requirement that the consent be unambiguous.66 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Anderson, supra note 10, at 1978. 
 61. Id. 
 62. State v. Prineas, 2012 WI App 2, ¶ 16, 338 Wis. 2d 362, 373, 809 N.W.2d 68, 74 (quoting State 
v. Long, 2009 WI 36, ¶ 31, 317 Wis. 2d 92, 107, 765 N.W.2d 557, 564–65); see also WIS. STAT ANN. 
§ 940.225(4) (West 2013). 
 63. State v. Garron, 827 A.2d 243, 268–69 (N.J. 2003) (“Both the Code’s provisions with respect to 
rape and the Rape Shield Law were intended to protect rape victims while defining the permissible 
restrictions on a defendant’s attempts to demonstrate the reasonableness of the defendant’s alleged belief 
that the victim has given affirmative permission to the specific act of sexual penetration charged in the 
indictment.”). 
 64. R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, para. 49 (Can.). 
 65. Lucinda Vandervort, Affirmative Sexual Consent in Canadian Law, Jurisprudence, and Legal 
Theory, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 395, 402 (2012) [hereinafter Vandervort, Affirmative Sexual Consent 
in Canadian Law].  In another article, Vandervort states that “Canadian law requires affirmative sexual 
consent to all sexual activity, not merely between strangers.  Sexual consent is defined as the 
communication, by words or conduct, of ‘voluntary agreement’ to a specific sexual activity, with a specific 
person.”  Lucinda Vandervort, Sexual Consent as Voluntary Agreement: Tales of “Seduction” or 
Questions of Law?, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 143, 146 (2013) [hereinafter Vandervort, Sexual Consent as 
Voluntary Agreement].  That description does not claim that consent must be unambiguous. Id. 
 66. No Canadian cases directly state that affirmative consent must be communicated clearly or 
unequivocally. 
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Many advocates67 as well as critics68 of affirmative consent seem to 
share the view that affirmative consent means unambiguous consent.  
Commentators discussing recent campus sexual assault policies shift from 
one policy to another without noting the significant difference that some 
policies require only affirmative consent whereas others require clear or 
unambiguous consent.69 
This understanding can be traced back to Stephen Schulhofer, an early 
proponent of an affirmative consent standard.70  Schulhofer has repeatedly 
proposed a consent standard requiring both elements: an affirmative 
indication of agreement (as opposed to an affirmative indication of 
disagreement) and that the affirmative agreement be expressed clearly or 
unequivocally.71 
Schulhofer argued that to adequately protect female sexual autonomy, 
“[c]onsent for an intimate physical intrusion into the body should mean in 
sexual interactions what it means in every other context–affirmative 
permission clearly signaled by words or conduct.”72  He recognized that 
“[t]here are many ways to make permission clear without verbalizing the 
word ‘yes,’ . . . [b]ut permission must be an affirmative indication of actual 
willingness.  Silence and ambivalence are not permission.”73  “Clear proof of 
an unequivocal ‘no’ should not be required.”74 
Schulhofer further explained his proposal in his influential book, 
Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law.75  Here, 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See Sarah Croskery-Hewitt, Rethinking Sexual Consent: Voluntary Intoxication and Affirmative 
Consent to Sex, 26 N.Z. U. L. REV. 614, 631 (2015) (“[C]onsent should be defined positively in a manner 
that incorporates ideas such as free, conscious, voluntary and affirmative agreement. . . .  [A]n affirmative 
standard emphasizes the need for consent to be a positive act, manifested through clear words or overt 
actions . . . .”); Beatrice Diehl, Affirmative Consent in Sexual Assault: Prosecutors’ Duty, 28 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 503, 511 (2015) (referring to affirmative consent as requiring proof of “affirmative and 
clear consent”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1453, 
1476 (2014) (describing the SlutWalk movement’s advocacy of a standard requiring a clear indication of 
consent as an affirmative consent standard). 
 68. Katharine K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 MINN. L. REV. 221, 263–
64 (2015) (“[ALI Draft] Section 213.4 is an ‘embrace of an affirmative-consent requirement.’  It makes 
clear that no one should feel entitled to sex unless one’s partner gives clear indications of consent.”) 
(footnote omitted); Dan Subotnik, Copulemus in Pace: A Meditation on Rape, Affirmative Consent to Sex, 
and Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 847, 848 (2008) (“What is affirmative consent?  It is a rule of 
law proposed by a number of male and female academics that would criminalize sexual penetration not 
preceded by real and very clear consent . . . .”). 
 69. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 10, at 1979–80 (quoting California’s standard and then New 
York’s standard without noting that New York adds the significant additional requirement that the 
agreement be clear). 
 70. See generally STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND 
THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2151 (1995).  
 71. SCHULHOFER, supra note 70, at 272–73; Schulhofer, supra note 70, at 2175.  
 72. Schulhofer, supra note 70, at 2181. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See generally SCHULHOFER, supra note 70. 
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Schulhofer can be faulted for failing to consistently recognize the conceptual 
difference between affirmative and unambiguous consent.76  There is nothing 
conceptually mistaken about proposing a standard that combines both of 
these elements.  But it is a mistake to assume that the term “affirmative” also 
connotes “unambiguous.” 
Schulhofer defined consent as “actual words or conduct indicating 
affirmative, freely given permission to the act of sexual penetration.”77  This 
standard requires an affirmative signal of agreement but, as stated, does not 
contain a requirement that the signal be unambiguous.  Yet, Schulhofer 
proceeded as if this standard includes that requirement, conflating affirmative 
and unambiguous consent.  He argued that the law should move away from 
requiring an affirmative “no” “and insist instead that the man have 
affirmative indications that she chose to participate.  So long as a person’s 
choice is clearly expressed, by words or conduct, her right to control her 
sexuality is respected.”78  Referring to conduct that might indicate agreement, 
Schulhofer states, “Only unambiguous body language should suffice to signal 
affirmative consent, of course.”79 
This repeated conflation of the concept of affirmative consent and 
unambiguous consent has persisted in both critical and supportive 
commentary, and it also seems to have created confusion in the standard 
universities around the country are adopting.80 
Following Schulhofer’s lead, commentators discussing affirmative 
consent often assume, without explanation, that affirmative consent includes 
a requirement of unambiguous consent.81  To be fair, many of these 
commentators are discussing Schulhofer’s proposal or others like it that do 
explicitly require an unambiguous signal of agreement.82  Thus, it is 
reasonable for them to analyze not just the affirmative component of 
Schulhofer’s standard but also the unambiguous component.83  But, 
regardless of what proposal is under consideration, it is critical to maintain 
the conceptual understanding that the term affirmative itself does not mean 
unambiguous.84 
                                                                                                                 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. at 283. 
 78. Id. at 272–73 (second emphasis added). 
 79. Id. at 272. 
 80. See infra notes 87–88 and accompanying text (describing the resulting confusion in university 
affirmative consent policies). 
 81. See Schulhofer, supra note 70, at 2181; see also SCHULHOFER, supra note 70, at 283 (discussing 
a requirement of affirmative, but not unambiguous, consent); David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 317, 397 (2000) (equating Schulhofer’s proposed affirmative consent reform with the 
standard adopted in the M.T.S. case, even though Schulhofer advocates for “clear and unequivocal” 
affirmative consent whereas M.T.S. does not require that). 
 82. See generally Bryden, supra note 81, at 396. 
 83. See id. at 393–97. 
 84. See Schulhofer, supra note 70, at 2181. 
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This mistake is very prevalent in the media where journalists regularly 
state or assume that all affirmative consent policies require that agreement be 
unambiguous.85  An article from the website Inside Higher Ed incorrectly 
quoted the standard from the draft California legislation, which required 
unambiguous agreement, as being the actual standard signed into law, which 
does not require unambiguous consent.86 
The failure to be clear about the difference between affirmative and 
unambiguous consent has resulted in confusion in university affirmative 
consent policies.  Most commentary on the recent trend of affirmative 
consent policies at colleges and universities is either generally positive or 
generally negative.87  These commentators fail to appreciate what appears to 
be a very considerable difference: some university policies require that 
consent be affirmative but say nothing about consent being unambiguous, 
whereas other policies require that consent be both affirmative and 
unambiguous.  Finally, some university policies blend the two approaches in 
a particularly confusing way.88 
California’s law states, “‘Affirmative consent’ means affirmative, 
conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity.”89  Neither 
that sentence nor later sentences contain any language requiring that the 
affirmative consent be unambiguous or unequivocal.90  A number of other 
universities have similar policies.91 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See, e.g., Jenée Desmond-Harris, Yes Means Yes: California’s New Sexual Assault Law, 
Explained, VOX (Oct. 9, 2014, 10:56 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/10/9/6951409/yes-means-yes-
californias-new-sexual-assault-law-explained (claiming that under California’s policy, “if both people 
didn’t make it absolutely clear that they consented to their sexual encounter, the college can find that the 
person who didn’t consent was assaulted. . . .  In other words, did she either say ‘yes’ or make it very clear 
that she meant ‘yes’?”); Ezra Klein, “Yes Means Yes” Is a Terrible Law, and I Completely Support It, 
VOX (Oct. 13, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/10/13/6966847/yes-means-yes-is-a-terrible-
bill-and-i-completely-support-it (claiming that the California university policy, which does not contain a 
“clear” or “unambiguous” requirement, means that “[t]he Yes Means Yes law could also be called the 
You Better Be Pretty Damn Sure law”); Maura Lerner, University of Minnesota to Adopt ‘Affirmative 
Consent’ Rule for Sex Partners, STARTRIBUNE (July 7, 2015, 2:53 PM), http://www.startribune.com/ 
university-of-minnesota-to-adopt-affirmative-consent-rule/311650821/ (noting that the University of 
Minnesota is “joining a national movement” to require affirmative consent and comparing its policy to 
California’s—notwithstanding the fact that California does not require unambiguous consent and the 
University of Minnesota does). 
 86. Jake New, The ‘Yes Means Yes’ World, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www. 
insidehighered.com/news/2014/10/17/colleges-across-country-adopting-affirmative-consent-sexual-
assault-policies (reporting that under California’s bill, as signed by Governor Brown, “[c]onsent is now 
‘an affirmative, unambiguous, and conscious decision by each participant to engage in mutually 
agreed-upon sexual activity’”).  The legislation as enacted does not use the term “unambiguous.” Id. 
 87. See id. (noting commentary both in support of the recent trends and from those who believe that 
commentary to be absurd). 
 88. See generally OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 38, at 3. 
 89. See S.B. 967, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (adding § 67386 to the California 
Education Code). 
 90. See id. 
 91. See supra Section II.B. 
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In contrast, the University of Minnesota’s policy defines affirmative 
consent as the “informed, freely and affirmatively communicated willingness 
to participate in sexual activity that is expressed by clear and unambiguous 
words or actions.”92  A number of other universities have policies that also 
contain the term unambiguous or some equivalent term.93 
Finally, New York’s state policy is an example of a policy that first 
defines affirmative consent without any reference to requiring clear or 
unambiguous consent but then proceeds in a following sentence to add a 
requirement that the consent be “clear.”94  New York starts by defining 
affirmative consent as “a knowing, voluntary, and mutual decision among all 
participants to engage in sexual activity.”95  This language, which is similar 
to California’s, does not use language meaning clear or unequivocal.  In the 
next sentence, however, the New York policy adds that “[c]onsent can be 
given by words or actions, as long as those words or actions create clear 
permission regarding willingness to engage in the sexual activity.”96  This 
seems to add a requirement that the agreement not only be affirmative but 
also that it be clear, which is a different concept. 
New York’s choice of language here shares a similarity with 
Schulhofer’s early proposal and can be criticized on the same ground: for 
conflating affirmative and clear.97  As noted above, one of Schulhofer’s 
definitions of affirmative consent is “actual words or conduct indicating 
affirmative, freely given permission to the act of sexual penetration.”98  He 
then states that this standard presents the question of whether “a person’s 
choice is clearly expressed, by words or conduct.”99 
The ALI’s April affirmative consent proposal used the term “positive” 
rather than “affirmative.”100  This is a notable distinction.  While university 
policies use a variety of definitions of affirmative consent, none of those 
listed in Part II use the term “positive.”  As Kevin Cole explains, the phrase 
“positive agreement” has some ambiguity.101  The ALI proposal did not 
define positive agreement, but some definitions of “positive” indicate that the 
term means “expressed clearly” or without “reservation.”102  Cole thus 
discusses the possibility that positive agreement might require some level of 
                                                                                                                 
 92. See Appendix to Policy: Affirmative Consent, University Policy Library, U. MINN., https://policy. 
umn.edu/operations/sexualassault-appa (last visited Nov. 25, 2016).  
 93. See supra Section II.B. 
 94. See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 38, at 3. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Definition of Affirmative Consent, supra note 39 (emphasis added). 
 97. Id.; see Schulhofer, supra note 70, at 2181. 
 98. SCHULHOFER, supra note 70, at 283. 
 99. Id. at 273 (emphasis added). 
 100. Cole, supra note 32 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. LAW INST. Discussion Draft No. 2, 
2015)). 
 101. Cole, supra note 33 (manuscript at 21–22). 
 102. Id. at 22–25, 22 n.40 (quoting Positive, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (1993)). 
74 TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:57 
 
enthusiasm from the consenting party or some level of certainty by the other 
party, and he criticizes the draft for failing to offer clarity on these points.103 
While the term “positive” may sometimes connote clearly or 
unambiguously, the term “affirmative” does not.  Accordingly, campus 
university policies that require consent to be affirmative do not contain this 
potential textual ambiguity. 
Ultimately, my purpose here is neither to advocate for the affirmative 
standard versus the unambiguous standard nor is it to discern precisely what 
it would mean to require consent to be not only affirmative but also 
unambiguous.104  Rather, the point is to highlight the conceptual difference 
between those two concepts and to call on advocates, critics, and other 
commentators to be explicit about which definition of affirmative consent 
they are defending or attacking. 
D.  Affirmative Consent and the Ongoing Shift from “No” to “Yes” 
Advocates of affirmative consent routinely state that under existing law, 
the complainant must prove some clear act of disagreement (“no”), whereas 
under an affirmative consent standard, the focus “shifts” to whether the 
defendant received an affirmative signal of agreement (“yes”).105  This seems 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. at 21–25. 
 104. For example, in another context (asserting Miranda rights in police interrogations), the Supreme 
Court has required that invocations must be unambiguous. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 
(1994) (discussing that a suspect must “unambiguously request counsel” to properly invoke the Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel during an interrogation); see WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 6.9(g), at 371 (4th ed. 2004) (“Ambiguous, Equivocal, Limited and Untimely Assertions 
of Rights.”).  This rule means that there are many cases in which suspects make some affirmative signal 
regarding their right to remain silent or right to counsel, and yet, that signal is not sufficiently clear or 
unambiguous to qualify as an effective invocation. See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra (“[A] statement that 
is much more limited by expressing an unwillingness to respond to a particular interrogator (e.g., ‘I don’t 
want to talk to you guys’), or an unwillingness to discuss the matter at a particular time (e.g., not ‘right 
now’), an unwillingness or inability to respond to a particular inquiry (e.g., ‘You’ve done asked me a 
question I can’t answer’) is not a general claim of the privilege.”). 
 105. An Act Concerning Affirmative Consent: Hearing on H.B. 5376 Before the Comm. on 
Higher Educ. & Emp’t Advancement, 2016 Leg. Sess. (Ct. 2016) (testimony of Deb Heinrich, Director of 
Policy and Public Relations), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/HEDdata/Tmy/2016HB-05376-R000301-
Deb%20Heinrich,%20Director%20of%20Policy%20and%20Public%20Relations%20Connecticut%20 
Alliance%20to%20End%20Sexual%20Violence%20(formerly%20CONNSACS)-TMY.PDF 
(“Affirmative consent is a shift from ‘no means no’ to ‘yes means yes.’  While ‘no means no’ places the 
burden on the victim to actively resist, ‘yes means yes’ engages both partners in a dialogue about what 
they want and about actively seeking consent.”); Desmond-Harris, supra note 85 (“[E]mphasizing that the 
law is a departure from the more common approach to sexual assault allegations, which is to ask if the 
alleged victim ever said ‘no.’ . . . It simply changes the nature of topic about which the accused and accuser 
are testifying.  In the criminal context, the question the court asks is generally ‘Did she say no?’  In the 
California college campus context, that will change to ‘Did she say yes?’”); Humphrey, supra note 10, at 
55 (“At educational institutions across the nation, the affirmative consent standard shifts the burden during 
a campus disciplinary board’s investigation and adjudication of sexual misconduct allegations.  Instead of 
asking a sexual assault complainant if he or she said ‘no’ during the sexual encounter, under an affirmative 
consent standard, the questioning is directed toward the accused and becomes a matter of whether the 
alleged victim actually expressed a ‘yes.’”) (footnote omitted); Nicholas J. Little, Note, From No Means 
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to be another major concern behind the drive for affirmative consent 
policies.106 
Several significant clarifications are needed to understand this shift—
and to what degree it represents a shift at all. 
The first clarification involves distinguishing practice from doctrine.  In 
practice, it may be true that some prosecutors, judges, and juries are reluctant 
to find guilt in cases involving a complainant who is silent or passive rather 
than one who affirmatively expresses her nonconsent.107  This practice 
question is different, however, from the substance of the existing legal 
doctrine. 
The second clarification is understanding the actual state of the doctrine.  
Doctrinally, it is no longer generally true to state that the law requires an 
affirmative expression of nonconsent (“no”).  The shift from “no” to “yes” 
has mostly already occurred, regardless of whether jurisdictions use the 
phrase “affirmative consent.”  The change from “no” to “yes” in rape and 
sexual assault law has been underway for decades as courts have steadily 
abandoned and rejected any rule that requires the complainant to express a 
“no” or offer “verbal resistance.” 
On the first point, it may be true that the criminal justice system 
sometimes requires the complainant to prove some clear act of disagreement 
(“no”) to proceed with a rape prosecution or conviction.  It is difficult to 
assess how often, as a matter of practice, police, prosecutors, judges, or juries 
require clear evidence of a “no” from the complainant. 
If a complainant explains to police or prosecutors that she did not say 
anything (and thus did not say “no”) during a sexual encounter, then the 
police or prosecutor may use that fact as a reason not to prosecute the case.  
Some may refuse to prosecute because they believe that a failure to say “no” 
means the complainant actually wanted to have sex at the time and only later 
felt regret.108  Some may refuse to prosecute because even though they 
believe the complainant did not consent, they believe (falsely) that the law 
requires affirmative nonconsent.109  Some may refuse to prosecute because 
even though they know that the law does not require affirmative nonconsent, 
they nonetheless believe that a factfinder (judge or jury) will refuse to convict 
without clear evidence of nonconsent.110 
                                                                                                                 
No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational Results of an Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1321, 1347 (2005) (“The traditional system works on the assumption that consent can be 
presumed unless withdrawn by the women.  The victim is therefore required to demonstrate to the jury’s 
satisfaction that she made the man aware that she did not wish to engage in sexual intercourse.  Under an 
affirmative consent standard, the law presumes that a woman does not grant consent unless she is asked.”). 
 106. See sources cited supra note 105.  
 107. See sources cited supra note 105. 
 108. Little, supra note 105, at 1358. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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In addition to the role of the police and prosecutor, factfinders (judges 
or juries) may refuse to convict in a rape or sexual assault case in which the 
victim does not clearly express her disagreement (“no”).111  In part, this may 
stem from confusion about the legal standard because jury instructions in 
rape and sexual assault cases often do not offer much explanation of what 
constitutes consent.112 
A final confounding factor is that in many American jurisdictions, sex 
without consent simpliciter is not a crime.113  Instead, the prosecution must 
prove an additional element, such as force or threat of force.114  Thus, in many 
cases in which the complainant was passive, the most difficult problem in 
obtaining a conviction is not the consent requirement but the force or threat 
of force requirement.115 
In short, as a description of how the legal process sometimes works, it 
is no doubt true that in some cases, the complainant must prove some clear 
act of disagreement for the prosecutor to prosecute the case and obtain a 
conviction. 
In another sense, however, the claim that the law requires an affirmative 
“no” is false in many jurisdictions—false as a description of the doctrinal 
law.116  Some of this is a chronological issue.  Traditionally, the law was clear 
that the prosecution in a rape case had to prove affirmative nonconsent 
                                                                                                                 
 111. See Cole, supra note 33 (manuscript at 33). 
 112. See id. at 58. 
 113. See Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 1000–01 
(1998).  There are a few states that criminalize “sex without consent” without additionally requiring force 
or some additional element. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. For evidence of the difficulty of prosecuting acquaintance rape cases, see Donald Dripps, After 
Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the Prosecution of Sexual Assault?, 41 AKRON L. REV. 
957, 971–72 (2008) (canvassing evidence); and see also Schulhofer, supra note 70, at 2184 (“[O]ne thing 
missing in the law of rape is some way to punish sexual misconduct that is not physically violent.  It is as 
if we had a law against armed robbery but no law against theft.  The way to fill that gap is not to try 
expanding what we mean by force but to have statutes punishing, as an offense distinct from forcible rape, 
any sexual imposition without valid consent.”).  Many of the most notorious rape cases involving reversed 
convictions in which many commentators believe the evidence was sufficient to prove forcible rape 
involve courts finding insufficient evidence of force, not nonconsent. See, e.g., Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 
624, 628 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (reversing a rape conviction by concluding there was insufficient 
evidence of force), rev’d, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981) (reversing the appellate court and affirming the 
defendant’s conviction); State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 475 (N.C. 1984) (reversing a rape conviction by 
concluding there was insufficient evidence of force); Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1352 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (reversing the defendant’s conviction by concluding there was insufficient evidence 
of force), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1998).  Alston, Rusk, and Berkowitz are all used 
in Joshua Dressler and Stephen P. Garvey’s textbook on criminal law. JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. 
GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 397, 409, 419 (6th ed. 2012).  Alston has been cited 
in at least eighty law review articles, Rusk in over one hundred, and Berkowitz in at least fifty-nine. See 
WESTLAW, www.westlaw.com (login and search required).  
 116. See cases cited infra note 124 (describing rape cases that were successfully prosecuted without 
affirmative nonconsent). 
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(“no”).117  The older the case, the more likely for it to reflect this view; more 
recent decisions have repudiated many of those older cases.118  A few 
jurisdictions, such as Idaho, still explicitly require some express verbal or 
physical resistance to prove forcible rape.119  And there are a few recent cases 
suggesting that evidence of the complainant remaining passive and silent as 
well as failing to resist or manifest nonconsent is insufficient to show 
nonconsent.120 
But in recent years, there are many more cases—including cases in 
jurisdictions that have not adopted affirmative consent standards and that still 
require both force and nonconsent—in which rape or sexual assault 
convictions are affirmed on evidence of a purely passive complainant who 
did not affirmatively register her disagreement.121  For example, in People v. 
Iniguez, a 1994 case, the Supreme Court of California affirmed a conviction 
for forcible rape when the complainant was awoken by the defendant soon 
                                                                                                                 
 117. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 83 A. 1083, 1084 (Del. Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1912) (“If sexual 
intercourse is obtained by milder means, or with the consent or silent submission of the female, it cannot 
constitute the crime of rape in contemplation of law.”); State v. Green, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 255, 258 
(Ohio Ct. C.P. 1860) (“And as the State is required to prove the absence of consent, in order to make out 
guilt, a prosecution will generally be defeated by evidence of acquiescence. . . .  In such case, passive 
submission is evidence of acquiescence.”); Stringer v. State, 278 S.W. 208, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925) 
(reversing a rape conviction due to the failure to give an instruction that “[m]ere intercourse, coupled with 
passive acquiescence, is not rape by force.  There must be resistance upon the part of the alleged raped 
female . . . .”). 
 118. See, e.g., Curtis v. State, 223 S.E.2d 721, 723 (Ga. 1976) (rejecting earlier cases that required 
active disagreement and resistance, and stated that “[a]ny consent of the woman, however reluctant, is 
fatal to a conviction for rape,” and noting that “[w]e expressly disapprove and will not in the future apply 
this and similar language used in these and other cases, because such language is on its face plainly 
inconsistent with the principle that lack of resistance, induced by fear, is not legally cognizable consent 
but is force”). 
 119. See State v. Jones, 299 P.3d 219, 229 (Idaho 2013) (“We hold that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a charge of forcible rape based on Count II.  By her own admission, [the victim] ‘didn’t respond’ 
physically, or even verbally, to Jones’ advances on May 28—she ‘just froze.’  Idaho’s forcible rape statute 
expressly requires resistance.”). 
 120. See United States v. Inlow, ARMY 20070239, 2009 WL 6842640, at *5 (A. Ct. Crim. App. June 
15, 2009) (“The second difference concerns [the victim’s] resistance, or lack thereof.  Unlike their first 
sexual encounter, during the second incident [the victim] did not physically or verbally manifest a lack of 
consent to the sexual intercourse between her and appellant.  Rather, [the victim] just passively laid in bed 
during the second act of sexual intercourse because she thought she did something the night before to 
‘deserve what was going on.’ . . .  We are mindful that the government need not prove resistance as an 
element of rape, but a lack of resistance may be probative on the issue of consent.”); Travis v. State, 98 
A.3d 281, 291 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014) (“Subsection (a)(1)—‘by force, or the threat of force, without 
consent of the other’—deals with an act of sexual intercourse committed on a victim who is both conscious 
and competent.  Such a victim must make a choice: ‘Yes, I will’ or ‘No, I won’t.’  The very reason that 
the elements of ‘force’ or ‘threat of force’ are a part of (a)(1), but not a part of (a)(2) or (a)(3), is that in 
the case of a conscious and competent victim, mere passivity on the victim’s part will not establish the 
absence of consent.  The law looks for express negation or implicit negation as evidenced by some degree 
of physical resistance or an explanation of why the will to resist was overcome by force or fear of harm.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 121. See, e.g., State v. Leon, No. 1 CA–CR 10–0519, 2011 WL 2517325, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 
23, 2011) (describing a case in which the victim did not affirmatively register her disagreement); State v. 
Stevens, 53 P.3d 356, 365 (Mont. 2002). 
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before he began having sex with her.122  The court found sufficient evidence 
of nonconsent even though the complainant remained entirely silent and 
passive throughout.123 
There are quite a few cases—from a variety of jurisdictions that have 
not claimed to adopt affirmative consent definitions—demonstrating 
successful prosecutions of rape and sexual assault charges in cases in which 
the victim remained silent and passive and did not affirmatively state or 
indicate “no.”124 
This trend is particularly notable in a recent case from New 
Hampshire.125  New Hampshire’s aggravated felonious sexual assault statute 
appears to require proof that the complainant affirmatively said “no” or 
otherwise indicated her disagreement with sexual activity.126  The statute 
provides that 
A person is guilty of the felony of aggravated felonious sexual assault if 
such person engages in sexual penetration with another person under . . . the 
following circumstances:  
. . . . 
                                                                                                                 
 122. People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183, 1188 (Cal. 1994). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See, e.g., United States v. Datz, 61 M.J. 37, 38 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (reviewing a conviction of rape 
in a case in which the complainant remained passive and did not affirmatively say no, reversing the 
conviction due to evidentiary errors, and declining to address the sufficiency of the evidence); United 
States v. Clark, 35 M.J. 432, 433–34 (C.M.A. 1992) (affirming a conviction of forcible rape when the 
evidence showed that the complainant did not affirmatively agree or disagree); United States v. Kinney, 
ARMY 9800451, 2000 WL 35801741, at *3 (A. Ct. Crim. App. June 6, 2000), aff’d, 56 M.J. 354 
(C.A.A.F. Feb. 7, 2002) (affirming a conviction of forcible rape when the complainant testified that she 
did not consent and also testified that she did not say “no” or “stop” or yell out during the encounter); 
Leon, 2011 WL 2517325, at *3 (affirming a conviction of sexual intercourse without consent when the 
defendant engaged in sex with the complainant “without consent or an indication of consent,” 
notwithstanding testimony that the complainant “did not object or say no”); Stevens, 53 P.3d at 365 
(affirming the convictions of sexual assault without consent, rejecting the defendant’s argument “that 
since the victims in this case failed to ‘communicate’ their dissatisfaction when he initiated sexual contact 
during the massage, he could not have possibly known that they did not find the contact ‘agreeable,’” and 
agreeing with the prosecution’s claim that “the victims’ testimony that they ‘froze’ out of fear indicated 
they did not consent to [defendant’s] sexual contact”); State v. Krieger, No. COA12–730, 2012 WL 
6591662, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2012) (affirming a rape conviction in a case in which the defendant 
grabbed the victim at a park and engaged in various sex acts with her, and the victim “did not cry or scream 
because she ‘was frozen in shock and fear’”); State v. El-Berri, No. 89477, 2008 WL 2764873, at *2 (Ohio 
Ct. App. July 17, 2008) (sustaining a conviction of forcible rape in a case in which the complainant 
remained entirely passive during the encounter, never affirmatively indicating her willingness or 
unwillingness to sex); State v. Neubauer, 162 P.3d 1044, 1046 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming a conviction 
of sexual intercourse without consent, even though the complainant testified that “[she] didn’t actually 
say no”); Holden v. Commonwealth, No. 2245–97–2, 1998 WL 345525, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 
1998) (affirming a conviction of forcible sodomy in a case in which the complainant “neither protested 
nor resisted” but “pretended to be asleep” during the sexual encounter “because she was ‘scared to move 
or do anything’”); State v. Pitmon, 379 P.2d 922, 923–24 (Wash. 1963) (discussing the complainant’s 
testimony that established she was terrified, played a passive role, and did not resist or verbally disagree; 
the conviction of rape was affirmed). 
 125. State v. Lisasuain, 117 A.3d 1154, 1159 (N.H. 2015). 
 126. Id. at 1158–59. 
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. . .  When at the time of the sexual assault, the victim indicates by speech 
or conduct that there is not freely given consent to performance of the sexual 
act.127 
 
In New Hampshire v. Lisasuain, the defendant—a forty-six-year-old 
man—performed oral sex and digital penetration on a fourteen-year-old 
girl.128  The defendant, Lisasuain, was a friend of the family who had been 
staying at the girl’s home.129  While the girl was lying on the couch watching 
television, Lisasuain began giving her a foot rub.130  He then began sucking 
her toes, and the complainant was “in shock.”131  He told her she was 
“dangerously beautiful” and eventually got down on his knees.132  He asked 
her “if he could go lower,” and the complainant “assumed that he was talking 
about [her] vagina.”133  Throughout, she said nothing and did not answer 
because she “couldn’t believe what was going on.”134  The defendant then 
removed her pants and underwear, performed oral sex on her, and penetrated 
her vagina with his fingers.135 
The defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that 
“the victim indicate[d] by speech or conduct that there [was] not freely given 
consent to performance of the sexual act” because “the victim did not testify 
that she pushed the defendant away or told him to stop or took any other kind 
of affirmative action to express that consent was not freely given.”136  The 
defendant argued “that the legislature ‘has chosen only to criminalize sexual 
penetration where there is an affirmative statement of non-consent, rather 
than criminalizing sexual penetration unless there is an affirmative statement 
of consent’”—a fairly reasonable argument in light of the language of New 
Hampshire’s statute.137  The defendant argued that the State was required to 
prove “‘that the victim somehow, through verbal or physical action, 
communicate[d] her lack of consent,’ and that the ‘legislature did not enact a 
statute that makes passive silence stand for lack of consent.’”138 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court disagreed.139  The court effectively 
reasoned that the victim’s failure to respond was in fact an indication of 
nonconsent: “[I]n failing to respond in any way, [the victim] indicated that 
                                                                                                                 
 127. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(m) (2007). 
 128. Lisasuain, 117 A.3d at 1157. 
 129. Id. at 1156. 
 130. Id. at 1157. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1157–58. 
 137. Id. at 1158. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1160. 
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she did not consent to the sexual assaults by the defendant.”140  Thus, the 
court affirmed the defendant’s conviction.141 
The Lisasuain decision is a particularly striking example of the trend 
away from requiring affirmative evidence of nonconsent because it involved 
a state statute that plausibly appeared to require just that.142  Even given such 
a statute, the New Hampshire Supreme Court construed the statute to permit 
a finding of nonconsent even when the victim remained entirely silent and 
passive.143 
It is thus increasingly inaccurate to claim that courts require the 
prosecution in rape or sexual assault cases to show some affirmative 
disagreement or verbal resistance, and that is true even in jurisdictions that 
do not claim to have adopted an affirmative consent standard. 
The upshot of this discussion is that an affirmative consent standard 
does not represent a meaningful departure from the existing law of consent 
in most jurisdictions.  At most, it may serve as a helpful clarification, 
reminding judges and jurors that the prosecution is not required to prove 
some affirmative indication of nonagreement and that purely silent or passive 
behavior standing alone is not sufficient to infer consent. 
To the extent that the criminal justice system does require a complainant 
to show a clear “no,” that problem mostly lies with police, prosecutors, 
judges, or juries, who may be reluctant to investigate, prosecute, or convict 
(respectively) without some clear expression of nonconsent by the 
complainant.  Thus, a doctrinal reform misses the mark—the target of reform 
should be changing prosecutorial and police policies and training, as well as 
improving jury instructions and juror training. 
In the few jurisdictions that do continue to require some affirmative 
showing of disagreement by the complainant, an affirmative consent standard 
(like those in New Jersey, Wisconsin, and other states) would be a 
meaningful reform.  In most other jurisdictions, this doctrinal transformation 
has already occurred.  A clear statutory definition of consent, requiring some 
act or indication of agreement, would be a useful clarification of the law but 
not a significant change from existing doctrine. 
E.  The Role of Silence in Affirmative Consent: An Ambiguous Standard 
A major component of affirmative consent standards is the role of 
silence or passivity in consent.144  This issue seems to be one of the primary 
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 144. See id. at 1154–60; Anderson, supra note 10, at 1978–79. 
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purposes of enacting an affirmative consent standard.145  As noted above, 
Michelle Anderson explained,  
Affirmative consent is the notion that mere passivity or acquiescence to the 
will of another does not constitute meaningful permission to engage in 
sexual penetration.  Meaningful consent must be active, and a person should 
have to communicate positive, verbal or nonverbal agreement to engage in 
penetration before someone else should be allowed to penetrate them.146 
 
Affirmative consent policies routinely contain language indicating 
consent cannot be inferred from silence or passivity.  California’s policy 
states, “Lack of protest or resistance does not mean consent, nor does silence 
mean consent.”147  New York’s policy states, “Silence or lack of resistance, 
in and of itself, does not demonstrate consent.”148 
These statements are often ambiguous and therefore difficult to assess.  
There are at least two possible interpretations of statements indicating that 
“silence does not mean consent”: 
 
1.  Silence or absence of resistance is irrelevant to determining consent 
 and cannot be considered in determining consent (Statement (1). 
2.  Silence or absence of resistance, standing alone, does not suffice to 
 establish consent (Statement (2). 
 
Statement (1) would be a very significant change to rape law, but it is 
hard to understand how this interpretation would actually function.  
Moreover, none of the advocates of affirmative consent policies seem to 
advance this claim.  Statement (2) is far more plausible but is, at most, a 
modest clarification of existing law. 
The first issue is whether the text of various affirmative consent policies 
embody Statement (1) or Statement (2).  Some policies, like New York’s, 
explicitly state the latter rather than the former by including language 
clarifying that silence “standing alone” or “in and of itself” does not show 
consent.149 
                                                                                                                 
 145. See Lisasuain, 117 A.3d at 1154–60; Anderson, supra note 10, at 1978–79. 
 146. Anderson, supra note 10, at 1978; see also Vandervort, Affirmative Sexual Consent in Canadian 
Law, supra note 65, at 402 (“When consent is defined as the communication of express voluntary 
agreement, neither passivity, submission, silence, nor refusal constitutes consent for the purposes of proof 
of the actus reus.  Facts that show the complainant was passive, submitted, said nothing by means of either 
words or gestures, or refused to comply with the assailant’s requests do not show that the complainant 
voluntarily agreed to anything.”). 
 147. See S.B. 967, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (adding § 67386 to the California 
Education Code). 
 148. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 38, at 3. 
 149. Id. (“Students should understand that consent may not be inferred from silence, passivity, or lack 
of active resistance alone.”); Student Sexual Misconduct Policy and Procedures: Duke’s Commitment to 
Title IX, supra note 36. 
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Other policies do not contain similar language but simply state that 
silence “does not imply consent”150 or “cannot be interpreted as [c]onsent.”151  
These policies are ambiguous as to whether they embody Statements (1) or 
(2).152  They do not contain clear language stating that silence is irrelevant or 
cannot be considered at all in determining consent, and they do not contain 
language clarifying that silence “alone” is insufficient to show consent.153 
If these policies are interpreted to mean that silence or passivity are 
irrelevant or cannot be considered at all in assessing consent, then the 
standard quickly becomes unworkable unless both parties are constantly 
repeating signals of consent—an approach that no recent defenders of 
campus affirmative consent policies have endorsed or defended.  In many of 
even the most clearly consensual sexual encounters—in which the parties 
have voluntarily, unequivocally, enthusiastically, and affirmatively 
expressed their agreement to engage in sex—there are periods of time during 
which one or both partners may be temporarily passive and thus not actively 
signaling agreement.  During such periods, both parties assume, reasonably, 
that earlier expressions of agreement remain in force unless something 
happens to suggest agreement may no longer be present.  The parties’ silence 
and passivity during such periods, absent some indication of nonconsent, are 
reasonably interpreted in light of the clear, voluntary, and enthusiastic 
agreement of moments earlier as indicating continued consent. 
A rule to the contrary—that silence or passivity are irrelevant and cannot 
be considered at all—would require both parties to a sexual encounter to 
continually send active signals of agreement to sex.  This seems unworkable 
and unrealistic, and does not appear to be advocated by any of the proponents 
of affirmative consent standards. 
This leaves the first interpretation: silence standing alone is not 
sufficient to demonstrate consent, but silence or passivity after active signals 
of agreement may be one way to infer ongoing agreement. 
This interpretation is both reasonable and plausible and, for some of the 
affirmative consent policies, clearly stated by the text.154  It is not, however, 
a meaningful change from existing law.  At most, this interpretation is a 
modest clarification.  As such, it is valuable insofar as it may assist juries 
who are confused on this point.  But it does not significantly change the 
existing law of rape and sexual assault because existing doctrinal law, for the 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See, e.g., GENDER-BASED MISCONDUCT OFFICE, supra note 29, at 10. 
 151. UNIV. OF HAW., supra note 29, at 8; see also UNIV. OF MICH., supra note 36, at 15 (“Consent is 
not to be inferred from silence, passivity, or a lack of resistance, and relying on non-verbal communication 
alone may not be sufficient to ascertain Consent.”). 
 152. See generally GENDER-BASED MISCONDUCT OFFICE, supra note 29; UNIV. OF HAW., supra note 
29; UNIV. OF MICH., supra note 36. 
 153. See generally GENDER-BASED MISCONDUCT OFFICE, supra note 29; UNIV. OF HAW., supra note 
29; UNIV. OF MICH., supra note 36. 
 154. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 478-120-024 (2016).  
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most part, already incorporates this insight that silence standing alone does 
not constitute consent. 
Distinguishing Statement (1) from Statement (2) is important, in part, 
because of the vastly different significance of those two rules.  Defendants 
often argue not that the complainant’s silence alone constituted her consent 
to sex but that the complainant’s silence or passivity in combination with 
earlier words, conduct, or both constituted consent.155  A few jurisdictions 
affirmatively require sexual assault victims to express disagreement.156  In 
those jurisdictions, silence alone does mean consent.157  But there are many 
more cases upholding rape and sexual assault convictions—and finding 
sufficient evidence of nonconsent—when the complainant was passive and 
silent.158 
In many cases, however, the dispute is not over silence alone but over 
the complainant’s silence or passivity when viewed in combination with 
earlier words or conduct that the defendant claims indicated affirmative 
agreement.159 
Michelle Anderson recognized this problem in her critical assessment 
of the “no means no” versus “yes means yes” debate.160  In particular, 
Anderson highlighted the role of silence under the “yes means yes” model 
and noted how similar it is, in many contexts, to the role of silence under the 
“no means no” model.161 
During a sexual encounter, once there are affirmative signals of 
agreement, silence is then often used to infer ongoing consent.  For example, 
Anderson cited Stephen Schulhofer, the “architect of the Yes Model,” who 
notes that “sexual petting” can indicate agreement to sexual penetration.162  
Schulhofer stated, “If she doesn’t say ‘no,’ and if her silence is combined 
with passionate kissing, hugging, and sexual touching, it is usually sensible 
to infer actual willingness.”163  Anderson thus observed that “[w]hen things 
heat up, . . . the Yes Model melts into the No Model, in which silence 
                                                                                                                 
 155. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 880 P.2d 226, 234–35 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994) (“Defendant’s defense 
was that he acted under a mistake of fact which negatived his awareness of the lack of consent, i.e., he 
acted under the mistaken belief, occasioned by [the victim’s] actions during the day and her failure to say 
or do anything during the event, that he had her consent to commit the acts of penetration.”). 
 156. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text (discussing cases that require verbal 
disagreement to prove nonconsent). 
 157. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts concluded 
silence and passivity failed to demonstrate nonconsent). 
 158. See cases cited supra note 120 and accompanying text (detailing cases in which convictions were 
upheld despite the complainant’s silence and passivity). 
 159. Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1405–06 (2005). 
 160. Id. at 1404–08. 
 161. See id. at 1404–05. 
 162. Id. at 1405. 
 163. SCHULHOFER, supra note 70, at 272.  
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constitutes consent.”164  She argued that this mode of analysis is really no 
different from the “no means no” model: 
If the woman is silent and fails to say “no,” one may presume she consents 
to penetration.  What happened to “actual permission” for penetration?  
Passionate kissing, hugging, and sexual touching supply it.  Once she 
engages in kissing and petting, the No Model supplants the Yes Model, and 
verbal resistance is again required.165 
Anderson’s criticism here led her to propose a new standard for consent—
the “negotiation model.”166  Discussion of that proposal is beyond the scope 
of this Article, which focuses on affirmative consent.  For present purposes, 
the importance is Anderson’s recognition of the substantial overlap, in many 
circumstances, between the No Model and the Yes Model. 
In sum, affirmative consent policies suffer from a critical ambiguity 
related to the roles of silence or passivity.  Whether the affirmative consent 
standard claims that “silence is irrelevant to consent” rather than “silence 
alone does not equal consent” is often unclear.  The former approach would 
be radical and unworkable, and perhaps for those reasons, supporters of 
affirmative consent policies do not seem to advocate for it.  The latter 
approach is reasonable but does not represent more than a modest 
clarification of most existing doctrines. 
In any event, clarity on this point—on the part of both critics and 
advocates—would advance the debate over affirmative consent. 
F.  Affirmative Consent and the Mystery of Sex Without Communication 
One significant point of conflict among advocates and critics of an 
affirmative consent standard involves criminalizing sex that is “passionately 
desired” but not “overtly communicated.”167  Some advocates of an 
affirmative consent standard recognize the risk of criminalizing sex in this 
circumstance but believe the contrary harm is greater: 
Of course, a legal standard requiring the expression of agreement inevitably 
makes sexual penetration impermissible in situations where passionate 
desire is subjectively present but not overtly communicated.  Yet the 
contrary standard inevitably has the opposite and far more dangerous effect 
of permitting sexual penetration when such intimacy is entirely unwanted.  
                                                                                                                 
 164. Anderson, supra note 159, at 1405. 
 165. Id. at 1413. 
 166. Id. at 1407, 1421–37 (“This Article defines and defends a new model of rape law reform. It 
argues that the law should eliminate the requirement of nonconsent.  In its place, the law should recognize 
the centrality of negotiation, in which individuals would be required to consult with their partners before 
sexual penetration occurs.”). 
 167. See Halley, supra note 49. 
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Section 213.2(2) reflects the judgment that the harms that arise under the 
latter standard present far greater reason for concern.168 
One critic of the affirmative consent standard called this “an astonishing 
passage,” reflecting the idea of “[c]riminal unwantedness.”169 
Both sides of this debate are mistaken.  Both sides share the view that a 
significant number of sexual encounters occur in which both parties 
passionately, voluntarily desire to engage in sex, and yet, at least one of the 
parties does not communicate this desire to the other party in any way—i.e., 
does not indicate through any affirmative signal his or her interest in sex. 
Why either side believes that this is true is unclear.  Certainly, people 
commonly engage in passionate, voluntary sex without communicating their 
consent in any legalistic, formulaic manner.170  Very few sign a consent form 
or expressly state, “I hereby consent to engage in the following act of 
sex. . . .”171  It may also often be the case that persons in a fully voluntary 
sexual encounter do not communicate with one another in ways that are clear 
and unambiguous.172 
Perhaps, then, this belief that “a legal standard requiring the expression 
of agreement inevitably makes sexual penetration impermissible in situations 
where passionate desire is subjectively present but not overtly 
communicated” stems from conflating the concepts of affirmative and 
unambiguous, as discussed above in Section III.C.173  But, as this Article 
argues, an affirmative indication of agreement is not the same thing as an 
unambiguous indication of agreement. 
When persons engage in sexual activity together, they communicate 
with one another in a myriad of ways.  They use a complex system of words 
and conduct.  The meaning of those words and that conduct is highly sensitive 
to the social context of the communication, the culture or subculture in which 
the participants are communicating, and many other factors.  This system is 
not unique to sex—it is human communication.174 
In many “voluntary, desired” sexual encounters, the signals of 
agreement are partly or entirely nonverbal.  In some cases, those signals are 
ambiguous.175  In other cases, the signals may be perfectly clear to the parties 
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in the particular context of their encounter, even if in other contexts those 
similar signals would not necessarily signal agreement to sex.176 
But there are far fewer cases of voluntary, desired sex in which there are 
no affirmative signals of agreement at all.  An affirmative consent standard, 
unless that standard also dictates the much different requirement of 
unambiguous consent, deals only with the latter situation, not the former.177 
A fundamental and ongoing difficulty, particularly in acquaintance rape 
cases, is adjudicating disputes over the meaning of various signs or signals 
in a given social context.  Affirmative consent is not a solution to that 
problem and does not ameliorate it.  Affirmative consent requires that there 
be a signal as opposed to relying solely on the absence of any signal.  But, in 
most cases, the most significant problem is not determining whether there is 
“a signal” but in determining what—if anything—different signals mean in 
the given social context. 
There are at least two significant difficulties in many contested rape or 
sexual assault cases: (1) resolving disputes over what actually happened 
(what was said and what was done) and (2) resolving disputes over whether 
a given set of words or conduct signaled a person’s agreement to engage in 
sex. 
The first problem is evidentiary and is resolved through rules of 
evidence, court procedures, and selection of a factfinder—often a jury in the 
United States but sometimes a judge.178  It is common to assert that the 
problem of “he said, she said” is particularly acute in rape and sexual assault 
cases,179 but it occurs throughout the legal system.  Claims of assault and 
self-defense routinely require factfinders to adjudicate between two contested 
factual claims, both by interested parties, and often without much in the way 
of corroborating evidence.180  Courts often adjudicate deadly self-defense 
claims on even narrower grounds—with only one “he said” because the 
erstwhile narrator of the other side of the story has been killed and cannot 
testify. 
Moreover, it is far too simplistic to retreat to the view that a rape claim 
is no more than a “he said, she said” situation.  Police and prosecutors have 
many tools at their disposal that they routinely use to test whether self-serving 
statements can really be believed—interrogations, the dogged pursuit of 
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corroborating or contradictory evidence, and the like.181  One former 
prosecutor of rape and sexual assault cases recently asserted, “There is no 
such thing as ‘he said, she said.’  There is always something more there.”182  
That may be an overstatement, but it is a healthy corrective to the notion that 
most rape cases boil down to “he said, she said.” 
In any event, our legal system is routinely tasked with determining 
“what happened” in circumstances in which that is a very difficult task.  The 
ordinary response is to insist on fair procedures and rules of evidence, zealous 
advocates, competent judges, and neutral, fair factfinders—and then entrust 
the task of determining “what happened” to that system.183 
Even after a factfinder determines “what happened,” the second 
difficulty in many contested rape and sexual assault cases is determining 
what those words or conduct signify or how they should be interpreted.184 
An affirmative consent standard neither helps resolve this difficult 
problem nor alters the nature of the dispute.  In the vast majority of sexual 
encounters, including the vast majority of those contested encounters 
involving an allegation of rape or sexual assault, some affirmative signal or 
signals are sent, or at least claimed to have been sent, between the parties.  
Some of those signals are clear and some are not; clarity often comes from 
social context.  In one situation, leaning back onto a bed during passionate 
kissing may be an affirmative indication to proceed further.  In another 
situation, leaning back may indicate uncertainty, unwillingness, or fear.  As 
Michelle Anderson has noted, there is substantial evidence that men tend to 
misinterpret women’s nonverbal behavior, “imput[ing] erotic innuendo and 
sexual intent where there is none.”185 
Requiring that there be an affirmative indication of consent does not 
solve this puzzle.  As Anderson explained, the dilemma remains in most 
cases, regardless of whether one requires an affirmative signal of 
disagreement (“no”) or an affirmative signal of agreement (“yes”): 
Under the No Model, a man may misinterpret a woman’s body language to 
mean consent to sexual penetration.  He has permission to penetrate her 
until she objects.  Under the Yes Model, a man may also misinterpret a 
woman’s body language to mean consent to sexual penetration when there 
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is kissing, hugging, and petting involved.  He may then penetrate her until 
she objects.186 
Stated differently, the problem in these cases is in interpreting the various 
signs and signals in a sexual encounter, and therefore, requiring that there be 
some affirmative sign or signal will not solve this interpretive difficulty. 
Accordingly, requiring that consent be affirmative—that some positive 
signal be sent—will impact relatively few cases—only those cases in which 
one party to an encounter remains entirely passive and silent.  Those cases 
are undoubtedly important, but as noted above in Section III.D, many of those 
cases are already successfully prosecuted under existing law. 
Again, this suggests that the notion of affirmative consent is a modest 
and helpful clarification of the existing doctrinal trend.  Unless affirmative 
consent is also coupled with a requirement to prove unambiguous consent, 
however, it is not a radical change in the law of consent.187  Nor would it 
result in criminalizing many sexual encounters in which sex is passionately 
desired. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Given the widespread adoption of affirmative consent standards for 
campus sexual assault adjudications and the ongoing debate over affirmative 
consent, it is critical for both advocates and critics to maintain conceptual 
clarity over what the concept of affirmative consent does—and does not—
mean.188  This Article seeks to advance that debate not by taking a side but 
by dispelling a number of common misconceptions and by clarifying what is 
and is not true under existing law. 
The basic concept of affirmative consent simply means that some signal 
of agreement must be sent by each party to a sexual encounter.189   This is a 
modest requirement and is largely a fait accompli because it appears to reflect 
the practice of most American jurisdictions in rape and sexual assault cases. 
The concept of unambiguous consent is different from that of 
affirmative consent, and this seems to be the source of much of the 
uncertainty, unease, and confusion over adopting affirmative consent 
policies.190  Advocates should be clear about whether they propose only 
affirmative consent or the additional, more radical requirement of 
unambiguous consent, and likewise, critics should separate the two concepts. 
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